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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN POLAND 
Adam Górski* & Maria Ejchart**† 
I. RE-OPENING AND CASSATION AND THEIR POSSIBLE ROLE IN  
THE EXONERATION PROCESS 
Poland’s criminal justice system embodies both ordinary and 
extraordinary means of appeal.  Ordinary appeals can be used against 
invalid judgments on both a violation of law (be this substantive or 
procedural, error iuris) and facts (error factum).  Violation of facts—
that is, failure to prove them properly—should be indicated directly in 
an appeal, in order to be considered by a court of appeal. 
As far as extraordinary means of appeal are concerned, parties to a 
criminal process have two avenues for questioning a valid judgment: a 
cassation appeal against the law and petition for overturning the criminal 
process.  The cassation system in Poland is not designed as an 
extraordinary remedy for those that were actually, factually innocent. 
On the contrary, facts are explicitly excluded from cassation grounds.  
Thus, it is only possible to correct a wrongful conviction if a violation of 
facts is a result of a violation of particular procedural provisions 
concerning the law of evidence and not only the general rules of 
evidence, such as free assessment of the evidence or the immediacy 
principle.  Thus, merely observing that a free assessment of the evidence 
or the immediacy principle has been violated without arguing for 
violation of specific provisions will not be successful.  This violation 
must be flagrant and have a strong potential influence on convictions 
(though a causal link need not be proven).  The result of filing a 
cassation appeal might thus be an acquittal by the ad quo court that 
convicted a person if evidence provisions have been clearly violated and 
if, in correcting these violations, a court reaches another conclusion, 
quashing conviction. 
To re-establish facts in a criminal process, however, parties must file 
a petition for overturning the criminal process.  Filing a petition for 
overturning a criminal process is possible for a number of reasons, of 
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which “new facts or evidence” are naturally designed for overturning 
wrongful convictions.  New facts or evidence, as grounds for 
overturning a criminal process in Poland, cannot lead to the conviction 
of someone adjudicated as guilty.  New facts or evidence should indicate 
that the convicted party has not committed the crime because of the lack 
of act or because the act was not a criminal offense or punishable by 
statute.  It is worth mentioning that new facts or evidence are subject to 
often diverse interpretation made both in legal doctrine and by Poland’s 
Supreme Court.  New facts and evidence should not be unknown to 
parties to a criminal process.  In line with a convincing interpretation 
new facts and evidence can be subject to the attention of parties to a 
criminal process when they were not initially considered.  The latter 
opens the way to exoneration quite broadly. 
Another ground for overturning a criminal process that leads to the 
exoneration of the innocent is that of propter criminis.  Criminal 
proceedings must be overturned if a crime committed in liaison with a 
criminal process gives justified reason to assume that the process may 
have had an influence on a verdict (not just a conviction).1  The causal 
link between the committed crime and the outcome of the proceedings 
need not, therefore, be proven.  However, the liaison between a 
committed crime and criminal process must be clear, though the law 
does not specify the nature of a perpetrator, nor does the law offer a list 
of offending crimes.  Obviously, though, crimes against the system of 
justice are at stake.  False testimony constitutes the vast majority of all 
crimes against the justice system.  However, false accusations can also 
give rise to exoneration pursuant to the reopening of a criminal process.  
Rather importantly, however, and in line with the presumption of 
innocence, such a crime is to be stated in a valid conviction unless 
another form of a court’s verdict is required by law or the respective 
criminal proceedings are suspended. 
II. EMPOWERMENTS AND MAJOR ACTIVITY OF INNOCENCE CLINIC 
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR), the largest and 
most experienced non-governmental organization (NGO) in Poland, 
confirmed the importance and significance of the problem when the 
HFHR established a program called the Innocence Clinic, which focuses 
on cases of individuals who have been wrongfully accused or convicted 
in criminal proceedings. 
The Innocence Clinic has been operating since 1999 and is currently 
 
 1. See art. 540 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure of 06 June 1997, Journal of Laws 89, 
position 555. 
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the only institution in Poland dealing with the problem of wrongful 
convictions and miscarriages of justice.  The program was created as a 
law clinic and was included in the didactic program of Warsaw 
University, with students of legal faculties as its participants. 
Individuals, whether or not they are accused, challenging the 
indictment or convicted in criminal proceedings, who challenge the 
accusations or trial verdict, can have their cases directed to the clinic.  
Within the clinic’s scope of interest are cases involving wrongful 
conviction and, under a wider interpretation, cases involving a 
miscarriage of justice. 
The Innocence Clinic thoroughly analyzes each case by researching 
the court files, interviewing the accused or convicted, and cooperating 
with their defense team.  From among the cases examined, participants 
choose those in which they determine that the evidence gathered is 
insufficient to deliver a guilty verdict, or in which the court’s 
consideration of evidence is questionable pointing terms of respecting 
the proceeding’s principles (e.g., a presumption of innocence and the in 
dubio pro reo principle) or the right to a fair trial.  In only such cases as 
these does the clinic take action.  Therefore, the program takes an 
interest in the cases of individuals who are actually innocent, having not 
committed the crime of which she was accused or convicted, and cases 
of persons who are legally innocent, where the evidence gathered is 
insufficient for a conviction and the court is obliged to acquit the 
accused under the principle of in dubio pro reo.  The clinic deals with 
cases at every stage of criminal proceedings, though the clinic’s 
activities differ depending on the stage of the proceedings and on 
available opportunities to gain knowledge about the case and the 
possibility of litigation.  At the stage of preparatory proceedings, NGOs 
are extremely limited in their capacity to take action, as the law does not 
provide any formal possibility to participate.  The Helsinki Foundation 
for Human Rights has, however, developed a series of such procedures 
that it uses in practice.  These include monitoring of court sessions in 
preparatory proceedings, particularly those relating to pre-trial 
detention.  The procedures also include presenting an amicus curiae 
brief to the court, analyzing the merits of detention, and preparation of 
or support for a complaint concerning the length of a court proceeding, 
if warranted.  However, an NGO would obviously have no opportunity 
to provide any evidence, so its actions at this stage are extremely 
limited. 
At each stage of the proceedings, but especially in the preparatory 
proceedings, it is particularly important to establish close cooperation 
with the defense attorneys of suspects and accused individuals, as they 
constitute the main source of knowledge on the case. 
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Opportunities to influence the judicial stage of the proceeding are 
much broader.  An NGO can obtain the court’s permission for access to 
the court files for the case, a widely used practice.  Further, Article 90 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the opportunity for 
organizations to participate as social representatives in criminal 
proceedings if there is a need to protect the public interest or an 
important individual interest, particularly concerning the protection of 
human rights and freedoms.  The law provides that a social 
representative may attend public hearings, take the floor and present 
statements in writing. 
Based on these broad legal rights, the HFHR developed the practice 
of submitting an amicus curiae legal opinion to the court.  The 
submission of such an opinion in a wrongful conviction case is 
undoubtedly the strongest, most serious, and most complete presentation 
of the program’s position of the case and a possible interpretation of the 
evidence.  The goal of these opinions is to gather and present to the 
court the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction concerning the essential issue.  In 
some briefs, part of the clinic’s opinion is considered like that of an 
expert. 
The court is not obliged to take an NGO’s opinion into account, but 
the program’s practice confirms the efficacy of this measure.  NGOs 
have an impact on the final shaping of the court’s decision, which 
speaks to the professionalism and high social confidence placed in the 
NGO, whose primary goal is to care for the rule of law and its 
appropriate use.  These actions also serve to increase confidence in the 
courts and judiciary by encouraging the belief that courts properly assess 
cases.  In its opinions, the program, therefore, does not explicitly refer to 
assessing the guilt of the accused but instead represents only the public 
interest in ensuring a fair trial. 
The power of social organizations in criminal proceedings extends to 
inclusion of the submission of statements at the final stage for the 
defense, before the court delivers its judgment. 
During appeal proceedings, social organizations have similar 
opportunities, subject only to the rules and restrictions of this stage of 
the proceedings. 
Some recent controversy of the status of amicus curiae opinion 
concerns the program’s participation in the cassation stage of a case 
before the Supreme Court (the only cassation court in Poland).  During a 
recently completed case covered by the Innocence Clinic, the Supreme 
Court expressed doubt as to whether the opinion amicus curiae 
submitted—containing an evaluation of the judiciary proceedings as 
well as the violations that occurred during preparatory proceedings—is 
an excessive interference in the sphere of adjudication, which is 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss4/7
2012] WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN POLAND 1183 
reserved for the court.  The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that 
the NGO’s position in the case should be formulated similar to a 
cassation.  In the program’s opinion, however, presenting a quasi-
cassation distorted the purpose of the amicus curiae institution, which 
aimed to assist a court in deciding a particular case. 
The program also deals with completed cases in which the only 
possibility for altering the verdict is to overturn the original criminal 
proceedings.  The basis for overturning proceedings is, as described 
above, the disclosure of new facts or evidence that were unknown to the 
court and to the parties at the previous stage of proceedings.  The 
Innocence Clinic does not have the ability to search for new evidence, 
but if such evidence comes to light (e.g., the emergence of a new 
essential witness), the clinic formulates a petition to overturn the 
proceedings on behalf of the convicted person. 
The program can also have an impact on completed proceedings by 
requesting so-called extraordinary cassation, which according to the law, 
can be lodged by the Attorney General or the Ombudsman (Human 
Rights Defender).  In such situations, the basis of an NGO’s possible 
action is a request to these institutions containing an analysis of the case. 
During the twelve years of the Innocence Clinic’s operation, several 
hundred cases have passed through the clinic’s doors.  The clinic took 
the actions described above in several dozen of these cases as a result of 
serious doubts concerning the correctness of the conviction. 
III. DEFINITION AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND 
By discussing wrongful convictions in Poland we must depart from 
narrow and rather exact definition of wrongful convictions, as primarily 
convictions changed into exonerations by reopening of criminal 
proceedings.  There is still no research performed in this field in Poland, 
and even if such research existed, it would not reveal the whole 
phenomenology of the problem.  At present there are also no official 
statistics covering issue of wrongful convictions.  There is also no 
government agency monitoring the issue for the purpose of a law 
amendment.  The only comparable statistics that exist concern 
compensation cases which by no means reveal the scale of the problem. 
Instead, it would be much better to canvass practitioners with a 
questionnaire, which is still being developed.  Researchers are currently 
using techniques to interview practitioners and—the most fruitful 
element—to examine cases in legal clinics.  In their experience, bringing 
a case to reopen a trial is not a common occurrence.  To give an 
example, in 2010 the practice of the Innocence Clinic run by the 
Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights found that out of the sixty cases 
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examined, only ten cases involved legal steps being taken.  Of these, 
there were only a couple of reopenings, and in only one case was a 
person acquitted.  All this encourages one to examine wrongful 
convictions not from the context of reopening, but rather as a 
phenomenon to be observed in legal clinics.  This is what the authors 
consider to be their major task. 
As to the current state of the legal studies in this field, the apparent 
interest in the subject of wrongful convictions has not resulted in 
empirical examination of the issue.  Out of a mere two articles covering 
this subject in the Polish legal journals,2 only one of them includes 
empirical analysis by interviewing twenty defense lawyers.  Some 
articles deal with the somewhat special problem of politically motivated 
wrongful conviction in the Communist Era and also address the specific 
way of dealing with them after political change in Poland.3 
Although wrongful conviction is the subject of interest of 
professionals in the field of criminalistics and criminal lawyers alike, no 
one has effectively promoted this topic to date. 
IV. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND FEATURES OF OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: WHERE ERRORS ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR AND WHY? 
Before examining the subject, it must be stressed that both practical 
problems and systemic problems will be examined.  Indeed it is often 
hard to separate the two.  The assumptions made are based on interviews 
with practitioners and the already mentioned examination of cases in 
legal clinics.  Some of the conclusions are drawn from the first Helsinki 
Foundation conference of that subject held in 2010 at Warsaw 
University.4 
Poland’s criminal justice system is by and large divided into two 
main stages: preparatory proceedings and the judicial phase.5  
 
 2. Anna Sowa, Przyczyny pomyłek sądowych [Causes of Judicial Mistakes], PALESTRA 1–2 
(2002); J. Widacki & A. Dudzińska, Pomyłki sądowe. Skazania osób niewinnych przez sądy w Polsce 
[Miscarriage of Justice. Conviction of Innocent Persons by the Courts in Poland], PALESTRA 11–12 
(2007). 
 3. See W. Pływaczewski, Adam Górski, & Andrej Sakowicz, Wrongful Convictions in Poland: 
From the Communist Era to the Rechtsstaat Experience, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION. INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 273 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias, eds., 2008). 
 4. The conference can be seen at Konferencja pt. “Pomyłki sądowe w postępowaniu karnym”—
24 czerwca,  2010 r., WYDZIAŁ PRAWA I ADMINISTRACJI http://www2.wpia.uw.edu.pl/text8683, 
Koferencja_pt___Pomylki_sadowe_w_postepowaniu_karnym__-_24_czerwca_2010_r_.html (last 
visited 08.10.2012). 
 5. On phases of criminal procedure in Poland, see STANISLAW WALTOŚ, PROCES KARNY. 
ZARYS SYSTEMU [CRIMINAL TRIAL. OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM] 479–584 (2009).  On structure of 
criminal proceedings in Poland, see WOJCIECH DAJCZAK, ANDRZEJ J. SZWARC, & PAWEL WILIŃSKI, 
HANDBOOK OF POLISH LAW (2011). 
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Preparatory proceedings are by definition inquisitorial, while the judicial 
phase is adversarial (which as we will soon learn, does not exclude 
exceptional evidence initiative by the court).  Both phases are governed 
by the same rules of evidence.  These rules include the truth principle, 
the free assessment of evidence, and the immediacy principle. 
A. Preparatory Proceedings 
Poland’s system of preparatory proceedings differs markedly from the 
common law model.  Collecting evidence is almost entirely the role of 
the state, and the role of other actors is extremely limited.  This means 
that the quality of evidence largely depends on how prosecutors and the 
police act in their roles, as well as to the quality of investigations, 
especially the quality of experts.  At this largely inquisitorial stage, no 
private collection of evidence exists, so the defense questions only the 
findings of the state.  Therefore, the expert opinion commissioned and 
presented by state cannot be challenged by private expert opinion.  
Given the example of medical malpractice, an expert opinion presented 
by the prosecutor cannot be questioned by a private expert opinion 
presented by the defense throughout the whole criminal process.  The 
private expert opinion can serve only as “information on evidence.” 
At this stage of the proceedings, a prosecutor is not obliged to reveal 
all her evidence to the defense, which may practically exclude an 
effective defense and discourage defense lawyers from active 
participation at that stage.6  One may say that despite all the guaranties 
given in legal texts, the suspect and then the accused are poorly served 
with information by the criminal justice system at preparatory stages in 
a manner comparable to a kind of blind date situation.7 
 
 6. It was recently discussed whether or how far this obligation exists with regard to access to 
files justifying provisional arrest.  On that discussion see Piotr Kardas, Z Problematyki Dostępu do akt 
Sprawy w Postępowaniu w Przedmiocie Zastosowania Tymczasowego Aresztowania [With Issues of 
Access to the File in the Proceedings in the Application for Provisional Arrest], CZASOPISMO PRAWA 
KARNEGO I NAUK PENALNYCH 2 [J. OF CRIM. L. AND PENAL SCI. 2] (2008); Piotr Kardas & Paweł 
Wiliński, O Niekonstytucyjności Odmowy Dostępu do akt Sprawy w Postępowaniu w Przedmiocie 
Tymczasowego Aresztowania [The Unconstitutionality of the Refusal of Access to the File in Respect of 
Provisional Arrest], PALESTRA 7–8, 23–36 (2008).  Recently, the Constitutional Tribunal declared that 
the access to files with this regard is required by the Constitution itself and contrary statutory provision 
is void.  In its verdict of 3.06.2008 (K 42/07) the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland declared that 
arbitrary disclosure of materials justifying provisional arrest is unconstitutional.  Subsequently, the 
statute law was changed, but it is still doubtful if it meets constitutional standards with this regard, 
allowing for some discretion in disclosing provisional arrest files to the parties. 
 7. On defense rights in preparatory proceedings in general see TOMASZ GRZEGORCZYK, 
OBROŃCA W POSTĘPOWANIU PRZYGOTOWAWCZYM [DEFENDER IN THE PREPARATORY PROCEEDINGS] 
(1988); P. Kardas, Problematyka prawa do obrony w postępowaniu przygotowawczym, in TRESTNE 
CINY SUVISIACE S CINNOSTOU OZBROJENYCH SIL A OZBROJENYCH ZBOROM (J.Madliak, J.Mihalov eds. 
2009); CEZARY KULESZA, EFEKTYWNOŚĆ UDZIAŁU OBROŃCY W POSTĘPOWANIU KARNYM W 
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The latter systemic problem is especially apparent in medical 
malpractice cases and, most of all, in child abuse cases.  It is noticeable 
that the opinion of a psychologist at the preparatory stage, combined 
with the statements of abused children and their mothers, very often 
determines the case.  In such cases, the course of the proceedings 
leading to conviction largely depends on our understanding of free 
assessment of evidence and to some degree our understanding and scale 
of the immediacy principle. 
1. Case of K.S.: The Expert’s Prejudgment Opinion About Guilt 
One example of a case where a psychologist’s opinion, presented by 
the prosecutor during the preparatory proceedings, determined the guilt 
of the accused is that of K.S., who was accused of the sexual abuse of 
his two daughters, aged five and three.  The accusation was based on the 
testimony of his ex-wife, given during a pending divorce proceeding.  
The girls were interviewed in the presence of a psychologist who 
concluded, on the basis of his observations, that the girls had been 
sexually abused.  The psychologist went beyond the acceptable range of 
opinion, stating, “[M]ost likely, the children had been sexually abused 
by their father.”  The other evidence in this case was the testimony of 
the girls’ mother and grandparents. 
During the first proceeding, the court acquitted the accused by 
recognizing that there was insufficient evidence that the father had 
committed the abuse.  On appeal, however, the court referred the case 
for retrial due to insufficient consideration of all evidence.  In 
reconsidering the case, the first-instance court dismissed the defense’s 
motion to appoint a team of experts from a scientific institute to question 
the opinion presented by the prosecutor; the court found that the 
gathered evidence, including the psychologist’s written opinion, was 
sufficient to convict K.S., who was sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment.  
The court of appeals upheld the verdict.  In cassation proceedings, 
however, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts violated the 
principle of immediacy by basing its judgments on the psychologist’s 
opinion without hearing it directly.  After five years of proceedings, 
three of which K.S. had spent in prison, the process started again. 
B. “Special Witness” and False Allegations 
Under the rules of evidence, free assessment of evidence is an 
 
PERSPEKTYWIE PRAWNOPORÓWNAWCZEJ [EFFICIENCY OF DEFENDER PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE] (2005). 
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unlimited principle in the Polish legal system.  Theoretically, finding the 
truth requires no corroboration of evidence at all.  However, in one of its 
judgments, the Supreme Court has introduced several obligations 
regarding the corroboration of evidence.8  It is still a contentious issue as 
to whether this judgment is contrary to free assessment of evidence or 
not.  Those duties refer to above all to the following pieces of evidence: 
(1) anonymous witnesses; (2) crown witnesses (procedurally and 
substantively);9 and (3) self-accusations, as well as allegations, which 
should be examined with special scrutiny. 
The gravity of this jurisprudence is self-explanatory and has huge 
importance because false allegations and testimony are a more common 
occurrence in types of cases involving special witnesses.  In spite of 
that, in the practice of certain legal clinics, there are cases where the 
confessions of crown witnesses are not at all corroborated. 
In one such case, a conviction was secured on the basis of the false 
allegation of a crown witness and the testimony of another witness who 
stated that he saw the suspect in town on the given day. 
1. Case of A.S. and U.L.: False Witness Allegation 
By far, the Innocence Clinic’s most common cases are those in which 
the sole or primary evidence is a false witness allegation.  These cases 
involve imputing the commission of a crime on the factually innocent 
person.  The examples below are of cases in which an anonymous 
witness chose to give testimony and cooperate because of personal gain. 
One such case is a multi-threaded criminal proceeding called “the 
Octopus,” described in the Polish media in 2006–2007 as a success for 
the public prosecutor’s office.  In this case, many were accused, mostly 
of bribery, entirely on the basis of a witness testimony that was later 
determined to be false.  The witness was a woman who had been 
repeatedly sentenced for fraud.  In exchange for her cooperation with the 
prosecutor’s office and in return for giving false testimonies, she was 
granted multiple postponements on the execution of custodial sentences.  
The prosecutor proposed to repeal a judge’s immunity on the basis of 
 
 8. See, for example, judgments cited in KATARZYNA BORATYŃSKA, ADAM GÓRSKI, ANDRZEJ 
SAKOWICZ & ANDRZEJ WAŻNY, KODEKS POSTĘPOWANIA KARNEGO. KOMENTARZ [CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. COMMENT] 417 (2007). 
 9. Polish criminal justice system includes two kinds of crown witnesses.  A “procedural” crown 
witness is regulated in a respective statute.  His testimonies are rewarded with impunity, whereas 
snitches of a “substantive” crown witness have an impact on the imposed penalty.  See regulation of 
“substantive” crown witness in art. 60.3-4 in the Polish Substantive Criminal Code, Dziennik Ustaw 
[Journal Of Laws] 88, position 553, with subsequent changes.  As to regulation of procedural crown 
witness, it is envisaged in a special “Crown Witness Statute” Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 114, 
position 738. 
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this witness’s testimony, which resulted in the start of criminal 
proceedings against the judge.  The witness had testified that in 2000, 
the judge accepted a bribe in return for issuing a favorable sentence 
against an offender.  The disciplinary court evaluating the evidence set 
aside the judge’s immunity, finding that the witness’s testimony showed 
a high degree of probability that the judge had committed a crime.  In 
2007, the Supreme Court examined the case on appeal and stated that 
the decision to set aside the judge’s immunity should be well-
reconsidered and proceeded through a thorough assessment of the 
evidence.  The court stressed that the witness’s testimony was 
inconsistent and that, because of her background and personality, she 
could not be considered reliable.  The Supreme Court disagreed with her 
accusations regarding the judge. 
Based on the testimony of the same witness, the prosecutor also 
accused two psychiatrists of accepting a financial benefit—the 
equivalent of $150—in exchange for providing a favorable medical 
opinion six years earlier that had allowed the perpetrator of a car 
accident to avoid imprisonment.  The court used the witness’s 
testimony, being the only evidence, as the basis for its decision to hold 
both psychiatrists in pretrial detention for over twelve months. 
After four years, the court discontinued the proceedings in the case 
because of the low social harm of the crime (the value of the gift 
accepted by the doctors was re-assessed to be $10).  The court also 
stressed that the testimony of just one witness, who was herself not very 
credible, raised some doubts about the guilt of the accused.  
As the result of an appeal lodged by the prosecutor, the court of 
appeals referred the case for retrial.  Proceedings began again in May 
2011. 
C. The Discussion on Reparatory Proceedings Continued: Who Does 
the Job and How It May Affect the Main Proceedings 
In preparatory proceedings, the role of prosecutors may be purely 
formal.  There is no special investigative police and some officers 
simply make irreversible mistakes at crime scenes in evidence gathering, 
or refuse to act at all.  Many mistakes are made at accident scenes.  The 
2003 criminal procedure reform, which greatly increased the 
investigative powers of the police, can, for example, be regarded as a 
mistake.  If we combine this with the fact that a large part of evidence 
material is simply reproduced (read out from protocols) at trial, the 
result requires no further explanation.  This is where the immediacy 
principle comes into play. 
The immediacy principle may be the most abused principle in 
10
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Poland’s criminal process.  The acceptable exceptions to this principle 
are already significant and should not be extended any further.  Poland’s 
system of appeal largely excludes a holistic revision of the case in the 
second instance.  It is possible, therefore, that a case can return several 
times after an invalid judgment has been repeatedly appealed.  This may 
last several years, as is evidenced by some cases examined in the legal 
clinics.  The solution to the problem of duration of criminal process is 
paradoxically associated with breaking the immediacy principle in terms 
of basing assumptions on written protocols.  This solution, 
paradoxically, would not result in a greater number of exonerations, 
which may be the first impression. 
The latest draft amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure give 
back prior investigative powers to the prosecutors. This is a good 
development, but it should go along with more emphasis given to the 
immediacy principle at the judicial stage of the proceedings. 
Moreover, the execution of real investigative powers by the 
prosecutor should go hand in hand with making a single person 
responsible for the whole job of investigating, filing the accusation act, 
and supporting it in the court proceedings to the greatest possible 
degree.  At present there is actually no evident personal responsibility 
for the indictment and it is pointless to explain how it affects wrongful 
convictions.  Anonymous mistakes are easier to bear and collective guilt 
is easier to cope with than the alternative. 
D. Judicial Phase: No Private Expert Opinion and Exceptional 
Evidence Initiative by the Court 
Private documents are excluded if they are produced for the sake of 
criminal proceedings.10  That effectively excludes private experts.  
Despite what has already been mentioned, however, it is important to 
highlight one other factor that is likely to produce mistakes: the court’s 
exceptional initiative in collecting and proving evidence at the judicial 
stage.  As a rule, the parties request evidence.  A court’s initiative serves 
the truth principle where there is no sufficient initiative to reveal the 
truth.  Of course, this initiative may eventually result in both a 
conviction and an acquittal (and so it was formulated), but this is a 
rather pure theory.  In reality, the initiative is used mostly when the 
prosecutor is not active enough in supporting her accusation, and the 
judge has intimate conviction of a person’s guilt.  If an accusation is 
 
 10. Recent discussions on that exclusionary rule were analyzed in a book by ANTONI 
BOJAŃCZYK, DOWÓD PRYWATNY W POSTĘPOWANIU KARNYM W PERSPEKTYWIE 
PRAWNOPORÓWNAWCZEJ [PRIVATE EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE] (2011), referring broadly to the work of Innocence Projects. 
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based on experts’ opinions, indication or allegation made in preparatory 
proceedings, the inability of the parties to produce its own private expert 
opinion at trial, combined with the court’s inner conviction, may result 
in a failure of both the truth and not preserving the principle of equality 
of arms.  In this regard, Poland’s criminal justice system has much in 
common with certain other systems.11 
E. Fast-Track Court Proceedings 
Another issue deserving of our attention are the Polish equivalents of 
plea-bargaining: sentencing without trial and fast-track trial.12  In both 
cases, the truth principle fully applies and one cannot make a deal as to 
the fact or legal classification but only as to the punishment.13  Truth 
should be established beyond doubt in preparatory proceedings in line 
with all the procedural rules.  A judge deciding without trial must base 
the conviction on evidence gathered at the preparatory stage.  Where 
there is any doubt, the case should be subject to the usual judicial 
proceedings.  Sentencing without trial can be applied in rather minor 
cases, which is possible when a crime is punishable with a custodial 
sentence of no more than ten years.  The usual offenses that are 
sentenced that way include thefts, car accidents, driving under the 
influence of alcohol, and fraud.  Economic fraud is also quite typical for 
a fast-track court proceeding.  In such cases the suspects may have an 
interest in reducing their appearances in court (perhaps to keep their 
reputations intact).  The difficulty in determining the scope of the 
problem in fast-track trials is of course, that after settlement, there is 
usually little interest in determining the truth.  Needless to say, there are 
no such cases in legal clinics.  With all the system of guaranties built 
into our model of fast-track sentencing and the academic accuracy of it, 
defense lawyers highlight this as the main source of wrongful 
convictions.  There are several reasons for this.  The first one is the 
already mentioned interest of the accused.  Additionally, for overloaded 
criminal justice systems, with all the importance of producing proper 
 
 11. Similar arguments are presented by Chrisje Brants, The Vulnerability of Dutch Criminal 
Procedure to Wrongful Conviction, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION, INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 172 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias, eds., 2008). 
 12. The issue has recently been widely discussed in the European literature by Gwladys 
Gilliéron.  See GWLADYS GILLIÉRON, STRAFBEFEHLSVERFAHREN UND PLEA BARGAINING ALS QUELLE 
VON FEHLURTEILEN [PENAL ORDERS AND PLEA BARGAINING AS A SOURCE OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS] 147–62 (2010). 
 13. For an overview of Polish regulation see SLAWOMIR STEINBORN, POROZUMIENIA W POLSKIM 
PROCESIE KARNYM. SKAZANIE BEZ ROZPRAWY I DOBROWOLNE PODDANIE SIĘ ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI 
KARNEJ [POLISH AGREEMENT IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL CONVICTION WITHOUT A HEARING AND 
VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY] (2005). 
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statistics, fast-track sentencing is very tempting.  There is no more 
evidence produced to the court and the judge is free to assess the truth 
based on the prosecutor’s material, according to the judge’s intimate 
conviction.  Defense lawyers thus play a crucial role in encouraging a 
suspect to take what is offered.  Needless to say, that is where most false 
confessions occur. 
The typical error model contributed to fast-track trials lies in the fact 
that the accused may choose to plead guilty to a list of charges, 
including crimes that were never committed.   
V. A NEW EMERGING EUROPEAN PROBLEM: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
AND THE CROSS BORDER EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCESS 
Over the past few years, the member states of the European Union 
have undergone a process of far-reaching legal integration, as far as 
criminal law and procedure is concerned.  This process of European 
integration in criminal matters comprises many aspects of substantive 
and procedural criminal law.  It has received unprecedented attention 
from legal scholars across Europe.14  Although there is no federal 
European criminal law, the EU forms a unique legal space of criminal 
justice with many consequences in the area of wrongful convictions. 
The simplified extradition, the European arrest warrant (EAW), makes it 
very easy for a member state to have a requested person surrendered.  
The EAW system does not sufficiently protect an individual against a 
jurisdiction that is likely to produce wrongful convictions in general or 
in a particular case.  This situation may occur under the classical 
extradition regime, as the notion of flagrant denial of fair trial usually 
barred extradition.  If that were the case, then we should presume that 
this likelihood of wrongful conviction in general is greater in some 
countries and that would mean an unacceptable assessment of the 
criminal justice system, which some would rightly call prejudicial. 
However, the EAW system is quicker than extradition and more 
frequently adopted.  This is because it is the courts and not Ministers of 
Justice that cooperate and because many classical principles, such as 
non-extradition of nationals and dual criminality have been abolished. 
As a result of the EAW, an accused may be in a jurisdiction where she 
has less chance of a proper defense. 
The EAW procedure is deemed to be primarily automatic, based on 
mutual recognition and mutual trust.15  It does not make an assessment 
 
 14. For further references on the issue of European criminal law see ADAM GÓRSKI, 
EUROPEJSKIE ŚCIGANIE KARNE. ZAGADNIENIA USTROJOWE [EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. 
SYSTEMIC ISSUES] 447–91 (2010). 
 15. Mutual recognition of judicial decisions of EU member states has long been regarded as a 
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of which jurisdiction is better to prosecute.  It will more often be the 
case that a short-term resident will be tried for a crime according to the 
principle of territoriality of the state of residence and not according to 
principle of nationality back in the resident’s home country.  This choice 
seems proper in terms of the truth principle, although it also includes the 
possibility of prejudice against a person tried in a foreign legal 
environment.  Applying the nationality principle is usually advantageous 
for the defendant, mostly because almost all the evidence must be 
transferred from the place of residence, which makes the criminal 
process and establishing the truth much more complex. 
The EAW however, only opens the discussion, and its major point is 
the European ne bis in idem principle.16  Over the past eight years the 
European Court of Justice has developed case law on when the 
European ne bis in idem principle applies.17  The European application 
of that principle is very broad and comprises even some prosecutorial 
pre-trial decisions and assumes a mutual recognition and trust that the 
trial has been fair.  Thus, it automatically includes an export and 
recognition of a wrongful conviction (as well as wrongful exonerations). 
However, theoretically, it also makes it impossible to open a process to 
prove one’s innocence in another country.  So the result will be that the 
convicted has to insist on re-opening a process in the country of 
conviction, despite the fact that the accused may have little or nothing 
more to do with that country and may not be familiar with its legal 
system.  This of course substantially reduces one’s chances to prove 
herself innocent. 
The latter problem would be reduced, provided that criminal 
information and legal aid in the EU were improved.  However, 
information on convictions and instruments of legal aid in evidence 
gathering in the EU do not come up to a satisfactory standard.  The lack 
of optimal instruments of transnational evidence gathering in the EU 
also has an impact on the actual inequality of arms and thus on the rights 
of defendants across the EU.  The new, speedy instruments of 
transnational evidence gathering in the EU, such as the European 
 
“cornerstone” of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. The principle has now been 
incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and is likely to shape future legal arrangements in European 
criminal law.  See point 3.3.1 of the Hague Programme, STRENGTHENING FREEDOM, SECURITY AND 
JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005/C 53/01).  See also art. 67 of the Treaty of Lisbon, available at 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (visited 17.08.2012).  
 16. Until recently, valid judgment based on the same fact in one Member State of the EU was no 
impediment to sentencing the same person twice in another Member State.  Now, the protection against 
double jeopardy is introduced in the whole EU and may, with all differences, be compared to the 
protection now existing in the US. 
 17. On that issue widely, ANDRZEJ SAKOWICZ, ZASADA NE BIS IN IDEM W PRAWIE KARNYM 
329-97 (2011). 
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evidence warrant, are designed for prosecutors and judicial authorities 
and have strengthened their investigative powers without giving the 
defense the equal right to obtain evidence from abroad. This is a 
systemic problem, which in effect, is likely to produce wrongful 
convictions in the recently changed legal circumstances. 
In addition, one more future EU arrangement should have an impact 
on the subject discussed.  EU member states will soon be obliged to take 
into account previous convictions in other EU member states, as they 
consider their own convictions with regard to recidivism or organized 
crime sentencing.18  It is not clear how valid exoneration abroad 
pursuant to the reopening of criminal proceedings, will influence a valid 
conviction, after taking into account a wrongful conviction in another 
country.  It is doubtful if any systemic European remedy to deal with 
that problem will be revealed. 
V. RECAPITULATION 
The above sketch describes our criminal justice system and may be 
seen as a little gloomy, more so than the everyday practice appears to 
be.  However, it was not our task to give an appraisal of criminal law 
and practice but rather to search for ways to improve the system. 
In order to recapitulate, it should be noted that the issue of wrongful 
convictions in Poland can be solved only partly through legislative 
amendments.  Allowing evidence from private expert opinion would be 
one desirable change.  Nevertheless, the problem is in the mentality of 
some judges, who too often unconsciously adopt the role of a 
prosecutor. 
Poland’s membership in the EU, as much as the membership of any 
other country, forces us to ask further questions.  We regard those 
transnational, unanswered European issues that may increase the danger 
of a wrongful conviction, or at least multiply the effects of wrongful 
convictions, as a discussion opener. 
  
 
 18. According to framework decision of 24 July 2008, 2008/675/WSiSW, OJ L.220/32 on taking 
account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal 
proceedings.  Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:220: 
0032:0034:EN:PDF (08.10.2012). 
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